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Abstract
We propose a data-constrained generalized maximum entropy estimator for discrete
sequential move games of perfect information. Unlike most other work on the estimation
of complete information games, the method we proposed is data constrained and requires
no simulation or assumptions about the distribution of random preference shocks. We
formulate the GME estimation as a (convex) mixed-integer nonlinear optimization prob-
lem which can be easily implemented on optimization software with high-level interfaces
such as GAMS. The model is identified with only weak scale and location normalizations.
Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the estimation of discrete sequential-move games of complete in-
formation. The estimation of complete information sequential-move games have received
less attention than their incomplete information counterparts 1. since they involve mul-
tidimensional integrals which incorporates a higher degree of computational complexity.
Recently, Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) have provided a simulation-based estimator for
static complete information discrete games based on importance sampling. Estimation of
the general class of sequential-move (extensive form) games has been quite limited 2.
To the best of our knowledge, Maruyama (2009) is the only existing methodology
for estimating such games. This estimator is a modified version of the GHK simulator
(Geweke (1989, 1991), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) and Keane (1990, 1994)) and
is essentially a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator. As is well known, MSL
is biased for any fixed number of simulations (e.g. Lee, 1995). In order to obtain
√
T
consistent estimators, one needs to increase the number of draws S so that S√
T
→ ∞.
Such an estimator requires large scale simulation making its computational burden high.
It also requires that the random preference shocks are normally distributed making its
scope for application limited.
We overcome these computational and theoretical constraints by using the generalized
maximum entropy (GME) approach3.
Our data-constrained GME estimator is obtained by maximizing the entropy-
information function of Shannon (1948) subject to the model property constraints (such
as equilibrium conditions). Due to the structure of perfect information sequential-move
1Studies of incomplete information simultaneous-move games (normal form) and dynamic games
include (Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov, 2010; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007)
2Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002) and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) estimate some simplified sequential-move
games with special game structures.
3The GME principle was introduced by Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996), which is based on the
classic maximum entropy (ME) approach of Jaynes (1957a,b). Further econometric studies us-
ing the GME approach include (Golan, Judge, and Miller, 1996; Mittelhammer and Cardell, 1997;
Golan, Perloff, and Shen, 2000; Campbell and Hill, 2001).
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game, the equilibrium conditions (specifically sub-game perfection) contain logical connec-
tions between the endogenous variables. The resulting constrained optimization problem
can be viewed as a mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem, since the logical state-
ments can be reinterpreted as binary variables (Williams, 1985). The problem can then be
solved with an efficient algorithm such as Branch and Bound (BB), Outer-Approximation
(OA) and or OA based Branch-and-Cut (B-Hyb). As shown below, with a linear payoff
function, our GME problem becomes a convex MINLP, which can be exactly solved by
many existing algorithms (Bonami, Kilinc, and Linderoth 2009).
Our approach makes several contributions to the literature on estimating game theo-
retic models of complete (perfect) information. First, by using the data constraints instead
of moment constraints we avoid the problems associated with multidimensional integrals
which makes the computational burden of our approach acceptable for most applications.
Although we focus on the sequential-move game, our approach can be extended to static
game of complete information 4. Second, our approach makes no assumption about the
distributional form of random preference shocks. In contrast, existing estimators for gen-
eral complete information games, such as Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) for the static
case and Maruyama (2009) for the sequential-move case require more restrictive assump-
tions. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) requires that the form of the distribution function
should be known. Maruyama (2009) requires that the distribution function should be
normal. Third, we reformulate the estimation problem as a MINLP since there are logical
connections between the endogenous variables under the equilibrium conditions. To the
best of our knowledge, our estimator is the first one to make use of MINLP in economet-
ric estimation problems5. Our Monte Carlo results show the validity of this estimation
procedure, which can be extended to other estimation problem where logical statements
4Golan, Karp, and Perloff (1998, 2000) also make use of the GME to estimate the static game. Their
constraints are moment based since they deal with the incomplete information case.
5Jouneau-Sion and Torres (2006) formulate the Maximized Monte Carlo (MMC) test as a Mixed
Integer Programming problem.
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arise.
The greatest shortcoming of our approach is that it is difficult if not impossible to
construct the large sample properties of our estimators. As argued by Su and Judd (2008),
in order to compute standard errors, we need to formulate the exact Hessian matrix
of the objective function with respect to the structural parameters. Such work seems
difficult within the MINLP framework. However, since our Monte Carlo simulations
show consistency and asymptotic normality of the proposed estimator, we use the paired
bootstrap method to construct standard errors. Following the arguments of Horowitz
(1997, 1998, 2001), Campbell and Hill (2001) and Su and Judd (2008), this method may
consistently estimate the distribution of our estimator.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete
sequential-move game to be estimated and formulate its equilibrium conditions. A simple
2× 2× 2 sequential entry game which will be used for expositional purposes is described.
A briefly reviews of maximum entropy, generalized maximum entropy estimation and
(convex) mixed-integer nonlinear programming are presented in section 3. We discuss the
identification issue from the nature of the game structure and equilibrium conditions in
section 4. Our GME estimation for the discrete sequential-move game of perfect infor-
mation is also presented. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted in section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The Model
There are T independent repetitions of a sequential-move game of perfect information. In
each game there are i = 1, ..., N players. Since we study sequential-move games of perfect
information we assume that player i chooses ai from the finite set of actions Ai after
observing i−1 actions. Define A = ×iAi and let a = (a1, ..., aN ) denote a generic element
of A. Player i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility is a mapping ui : A
N → R,
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where R is the real line. We will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no
ambiguity would arise.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i
can be written as:
ui(a, x, ǫi; θ) = fi(x, a; θ) + ǫi(a) (1)
where a ∈ AN . In Equation (1), player i’s vNM utility from outcome a is the sum of two
terms. The first term fi(x, a; θ) is a function which depends on outcome a, the vector of
actions taken by all of the players, x, the players’ characteristics and some other variables
which influence utility, and parameters θ, covariates x are observed by the econometrician.
The second term ǫi(a), is a random preference shock which reflects the information about
utility that is common knowledge to the players but not observed by the econometrician.
Unlike Maruyama (2009), here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions
a, not just the actions taken by player i. As argued by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010),
this is a more general setting. For example, in a simple entry game, the unobserved
information about one player’s payoff to the econometrician may not only vary across
his own actions but also across the actions of other players. ǫi(a) are assumed to be
independent or have some known dependence. Let ǫi denote the vector of the individual
shocks ǫi(a) and ǫ denote the vector of all shocks. We will discuss more about the structure
of ǫi in the identification and estimation section.
A strategy for player i is a mapping from Ai−1 to Ai, where Ai = ×j≤iAj. The
equilibrium concept corresponding to sequential-move games of perfect information, sub-
game perfection (SPE), is a strategy profile in which every player expects no gain from
individually deviating from their equilibrium in every subgame.
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Formally, an action profile, aSPE = (aSPE
1
, ..., aSPEi , ..., a
SPE
N ), is an SPE if
ui(a
SPE, x, ǫi; θ)− ui(aSPE<i , ai, a∗>i(aSPE<i , ai), x, ǫi; θ) ≥ 0 (2)
for all i = 1, ..., N and all ai 6= aSPEi ,
where a∗>i(a≤i) is an action profile resulting from the subgame that starts from player
i + 1 given the decisions of the preceding players, a≤i and where each player in the sub-
game uses the same strategy that generated the action profile aSPE. These equilibrium
conditions are defined recursively and the solution can be easily calculated by the back-
ward induction for any given set of parameters θ, observed covariates, x, and unobserved
shocks ǫ. Kuhn’s theorem ensures the existence to solutions of the inequality system (2),
and thus ensures that every finite sequential move game of perfect information has an
SPE. As noted by Berry and Tamer (2007), dealing with multiple equilibria complicates
the identification problem. Fortunately, every finite sequential-move game with perfect
information in which no player is indifferent between any two outcomes has a unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)). Since ǫi(a) has an atomless
distribution in our econometric model, we can ignore the indifference case.
Given this structure of the discrete choice sequential-move game, our task is to estimate
and draw an inference about the parameters of the payoff functions, θ, given a set of
observed action profiles ao, some covariates which effect the payoffs, x, and an exogenous
decision order. Note that the actual payoff levels are latent variables.
For the purpose of exposition, we provide a simple sequential entry game as an ex-
ample. There are two players who act as potential entrants in each of T markets. The
structure of this entry game is illustrated in figure a with payoffs u1 and u2 as defined in
Equation (1). ai ∈ {0, 1} is firm i’s action, 0 means no entry and 1 means entry. For (0, 0)
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P1
P2
f1(x, 0, 0; θ) + ǫ1(0, 0)
f2(x, 0, 0; θ) + ǫ2(0, 0)
0
f1(x, 0, 1; θ) + ǫ1(0, 1)
f2(x, 0, 1; θ) + ǫ2(0, 1)
1
0
P2
f1(x, 1, 0; θ) + ǫ1(1, 0)
f2(x, 1, 0; θ) + ǫ2(1, 0)
0
f1(x, 1, 1; θ) + ǫ1(1, 1)
f2(x, 1, 1; θ) + ǫ2(1, 1)
1
1
Figure a: A simple entry game
to be an equilibrium outcome, we require the following three equilibrium conditions:
u1(x, 0, 0, ǫ1(0, 0); θ) > u1(x, 1, 0, ǫ1(1, 0); θ) if u2(x, 1, 0, ǫ2(1, 0); θ) > u2(x, 1, 1, ǫ2(1, 1); θ)
u1(x, 0, 0, ǫ1(0, 0); θ) > u1(x, 1, 1, ǫ1(1, 1); θ) if u2(x, 1, 0, ǫ2(1, 0); θ) ≤ u2(x, 1, 1, ǫ2(1, 1); θ)
u2(x, 0, 0, ǫ2(0, 0); θ) ≤ u2(x, 0, 1, ǫ2(0, 1); θ)
(3)
The equilibrium conditions required for the other three action profiles to be equilibrium
outcomes can be formulated similarly. Since the econometrician only observes the equi-
librium outcomes but not strategies, the equilibrium conditions can be viewed as logical
statements that are conditional on the off equilibrium path choices, which are unobserved
by the econometrician. We make use of MINLP to handle such logical statements.
3 Preliminary
We start by providing some background to the GME approach. Also, since our GME
estimator is obtained via a (convex) MINLP, we also provide a review of the MINLP
problem.
3.1 A Basic Review of GME
In the classic maximum entropy (ME) approach, Shannon (1948)’s entropy is used to
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measure the uncertainty (state of knowledge) we have about the occurrence of a collec-
tion of events. Let x be a random variable with possible outcomes xs, s = 1, 2, . . . , n,
with probabilities αs such that
∑
s αs = 1. Shannon (1948) defined the entropy of the
distribution α = (α1, ...αn)
′, as
H ≡ −
∑
s
αs lnαs (4)
where 0 ln 0 ≡ 0. To recover the unknown probabilities α that characterize a given
data set, Jaynes (1957a,b) proposed maximizing entropy, subject to the available sample-
moment information and adding up constraints on the probabilities.
Within the classic ME framework, the observed moments are assumed to be exact.
To extend this approach to the problem with noise, the GME approach (developed by
Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996)) generalizes the ME approach by using a dual objective
(precision and prediction) function. We illustrate the GME approach via a linear model:
Y = Xβ + ε (5)
where Y is an N × 1 dependent variable vector, X is an N × K matrix of explanatory
variables, β is a K × 1 a vector of parameters, and ε is an N × 1 vector of disturbance
terms. The GME estimator of β in this general linear model is derived in the following
manner. First, pˆ = (pˆ′
1
, ...pˆ′K)
′ is derived from the following constrained maximum entropy
8
problem:
max
p′
k
,w′i
−
K∑
k=1
p′k ln(pk)−
N∑
i=1
ω′i ln(ωi) (6)
s.t. Y = XZp+ V ω
1′pk = 1, ∀k
1′ωi = 1, ∀i
pk > [0], ωi > 0. ∀i, k.
Z and V are K ×KM and N ×NJ matrices of support points for the β and ε vectors,
defined respectively, as:
Z =


z′
1
0 ... 0
0 z′
2
... 0
. . ... .
0 0 ... z′K


and V =


v′
1
0 ... 0
0 v′
2
... 0
. . ... .
0 0 . v′N .


(7)
The M × 1 vector zk = (zk1, ...zkM )′ is such that zk1 < zk2 ≤ ... ≤ zkM and it is assumed
that βk ∈ (zk1, zkM) for each k6. The vector vi = (vi1, ...viJ)′ is such that vi1 < vi2 ≤
... ≤ viJ and it is assumed that εi ∈ (vi1, viJ) for each i. Typically, each vi1 and
viJ will be uniformly and symmetrically distributed about zero and have the same J
dimensions. The actual bounds used for a given problem depend on the observed sample
as well as any available conceptual or empirical information7. pk = (pk1, ...pkM)
′ and
6This parameter support is based on prior information or economic theory, for example, we might
specify boundaries of zk1 = 0 and zkM = 1 when estimating the marginal propensity to consume. Without
any available prior information, we can specify zk to be symmetric around zero, with large negative and
positive boundaries, for example, zk1 = −zkM = −106.
7One viable approach is to use Chebychev’s Inequality or the three-sigma rule (Pukelsheim, 1994) and
assume the errors are drawn from a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance (ymax − ymin)/12.
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ωi = (ωi1, ...ωiJ)
′ are non-negative weight vectors that sum to unity. The GME estimator
is then given by βˆ = Zpˆ. Golan, Judge, and Miller (1996) has a rigorous discussion of this
approach and applies it to a rich scopes of econometric problems, such as dynamic models,
model selection and discrete choice-censored problems. Mittelhammer and Cardell (1997)
establish consistency and asymptotic normality results for the GME estimator under
general regularity conditions.
3.2 A Basic Review of MINLP
Our GME estimator for the sequential-move game is essentially obtained by solving a
generalized disjunctive programming problem, which can be reformulated as an MINLP
problem. Here we provide a basic review of the general structure and of existing available
algorithms for solving MINLP problems. A simple algebraic representation of an MINLP
problem is as follows:
min
{x,y}
Z = f(x, y) (8)
s.t. gj(x, y) ≤ 0, j ∈ J
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y
where f(·) and g(·) are differentiable functions, J is the index set of inequalities, and x and
y are continuous and discrete variables, respectively. In most applications the discrete
set Y is restricted to be binary. When both f(·) and g(·) are both convex functions,
this becomes a convex MINLP problem, which can be exactly solved via most existing
algorithms 8. We take the technique of solving an MINLP problem as given.
(Golan, Judge, and Perloff 1997)
8Methods for solving convex MINLP problems include the branch and bound method (BB) (Gupta
and Ravindran, 1985; Nabar and Schrage, 1991; Borchers and Mitchell, 1994; Stubbs and Mehrotra, 1999;
Leyffer, 2001), Generalized Benders Decomposition (GBD) (Geoffrion, 1972), Outer-Approximation (OA)
(Duran and Grossmann, 1986; Yuan et al., 1988; Fletcher and Leyffer, 1994), LP/NLP based branch and
bound (Quesada and Grossmann, 1992), and Extended Cutting Plane Method (ECP) (Westerlund and
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4 Estimation
In this section we first detail the assumptions required for our estimation method. We
then describe the estimator in detail before discussing its limitations and extensions.
4.1 Assumptions
We require three assumptions in order to use our estimation method. The first is
associated with the structure of the game tree, the second is associated with the ordinality
of utility, and the third is associated with the distributional properties pf the errors terms.
Assumption 1 (Exogenous Decision Order) The decision order of agents in the
sequential-move game is exogenous and known to the econometrician.
Although the exact decision order of agents is rarely observed, to estimate sequential-
move games we must assume a specific decision order.
Assumption 2 (Scale and Location Normalizations) The payoff of one action for
each player are fixed at a known constant.
From the equilibrium condition (2), any affine transformation of the payoffs does not
perturb the set of equilibria, so scale and location normalizations are necessary. The
scale normalization is subsumed in the following assumption about the distribution of
the error terms. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) argue that this restriction is similar to
the argument that we can normalize the mean utility from the outside good equal to a
constant, usually zero, in a standard discrete choice model.
Pettersson, 1995). Methods for solving nonconvex MINLP problems include LP relaxation (Sherali &
Adams, 1990), LP and SDP relaxations (Lov asz & Schrijver, 1991), SDP relaxations (Lasserre, 2001) and
Branch-and-Reduce (Tawarmalani & Sahinidis, 2002). Such methods are available in some optimization
software with high-level interfaces such as GAMS, AMPL, and TOMLAB which has a MATLAB interface.
In GAMS, both BARON and BONMIN can solve convex MINLP problems, but only BARON can solve
nonconvex MINLP problems.
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P1
P2
0
0
0
0
θx+ g(0, 1) + ǫ2(0, 1)
1
0
P2
θx+ g(1, 0) + ǫ1(1, 0)
0
0
θx+ g(1, 1) + ǫ1(1, 1)
θx+ g(1, 1) + ǫ2(1, 1)
1
1
Figure b: A Reformulated Entry Game
Assumption 3 (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks) The random prefer-
ence shocks ǫit(a) are i.i.d, are independent of state variables, and have zero mean
and finite variance, i.e. E(ǫit(a)) = 0, E(xǫit(a)) = 0,and V ar(ǫit(a)) <∞.
The i.i.d assumption is stronger than is required for our GME estimation. Any known
heteroskedasticity and dependence among random shocks can be handled within the our
framework. We will discuss this further after presenting our estimator. Our GME esti-
mator is semiparametric in the sense that it does not impose any parametric assumption
on the random shocks.
For the purpose of exposition, we apply GME estimation under assumption 1 to 3 to
the simple entry game which was introduced in section 2. We assume that utility takes
the form:
ui(x, a, ǫi; θ) = 1(ai = 1){θx+ δg(a) + ǫi(a)} (9)
The entry game is shown in figure b.
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The location normalization sets the utility from out of the market to 0 and scale
normalization sets the parameter δ to 1 9. The equilibrium conditions for action profile
(0, 0) to be an SPE outcomes are:
Player1: 0 > θx+ g(1, 0) + ǫ1(1, 0) if 0 > θx+ g(1, 1) + ǫ2(1, 1)
0 > θx+ g(1, 1) + ǫ1(1, 1) if 0 ≤ θx+ g(1, 1) + ǫ2(1, 1)
Player2: 0 > θx+ g(0, 1) + ǫ2(0, 1)
(10)
The equilibrium conditions required for the other outcomes can be similarly derived.
4.2 The Estimator
In order to use the GME framework, we need to specify the support space Z for θ
and the support space v1, v2, v3, v4 for ǫ1(1, 0), ǫ1(1, 1), ǫ2(0, 1) and ǫ2(1, 1) respectively.
Without loss of generality, all are M × 1 vectors and v1 = v2 = v3 = v4 = v. The
corresponding probabilities are defined as pθ, ω1t , ω
2
t , ω
3
t , ω
4
t such that:
θ =
M∑
m=1
pθmzm (11)
ǫ1t(1, 0) =
M∑
m=1
ω1tmv, ǫ1t(1, 1) =
M∑
m=1
ω2tmv, ǫ2t(0, 1) =
M∑
m=1
ω3tmv, ǫ2t(1, 1) =
M∑
m=1
ω4tmv (12)
The entropy-information function H is defined as
H = −
M∑
m=1
pθm ln(p
θ
m)−
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
ω1tm ln(ω
1
tm)−
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
ω2tm ln(ω
2
tm) (13)
−
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
ω3tm ln(ω
3
tm)−
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
ω4tm ln(ω
4
tm)
9One could also set the variance of the random shocks equal to 1 and let δ to be an unknown parameter
to be estimated.
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Our GME estimator is obtained from the estimated probabilities which are the solution
to the following problem:
max
{pθm,ω1tm,ω2tm,ω3tm,ω4tm}
H subject to the corresponding constraints: (14)
If aot = (0, 0)
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 0) +
∑M
m=1 ω
1
tmvm if 0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
2
tmvm if 0 ≤
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(0, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
3
tmvm
(15)
If aot = (0, 1)
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 0) +
∑M
m=1 ω
1
tmvm if 0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
2
tmvm if 0 ≤
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(0, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
3
tmvm ≥ 0
(16)
If aot = (1, 0)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 0) +
∑M
m=1 ω
1
tmvm ≥ 0
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm
(17)
If aot = (1, 1)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
2
tmvm ≥ 0
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm ≥ 0
(18)
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and the normalization-additivity constraints:
∑M
m=1 p
θ
m = 1
∑M
m=1 ω
i
tm = 1, ∀t ∈ T , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
pθm, ω
1
tm, ω
2
tm, ω
3
tm, ω
4
tm > 0; ∀t ∈ T,m ∈M
(19)
Note that for each repetition of the game, there is a unique equilibrium. Thus, the
constraints for each market are one of the four possible constraints listed in equations
(15) to (18). Our GME estimator of the structural parameter θ is
θˆGME =
M∑
m=1
pˆθmzm (20)
For this simple game, constraints (15) and (16) contain logical if-then statements
between endogenous variables. This programming is called disjunctive programming,
which can be reformulated as an MINLP. For example, consider the logical statements:
y1 < 0 if x < 0; y2 < 0 if x ≥ 0 (21)
By introducing a zero or one variable q, the statement (21) can be restated as:
x−K(1−q) < 0; x+Kq ≥ 0; y1 < K(1−q); y2 < Kq; q = {0, 1}, (22)
where K is a positive variable which exceeds the bound of |x|, |y1| and |y2|. Such re-
formulations are discussed extensively in Williams (1985) and Raman and Grossmann
(1991).
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By introducing such a binary variable K, our GME method can be reformulated as:
max
{pθm,ω1tm,ω2tm,ω3tm,ω4tm,qt}
H s.t. (23)
If aot = (0, 0)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm ≥ −Kqt
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm < K(1− qt)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 0) +
∑M
m=1 ω
1
tmvm < K(1− qt)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
2
tmvm < Kqt
0 >
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(0, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
3
tmvm
if aot = (0, 1)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm ≥ −Kqt
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
4
tmvm < K(1− qt)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 0) +
∑M
m=1 ω
1
tmvm < K(1− qt)
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(1, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
2
tmvm < Kqt
∑M
m=1 p
θ
mzmxt + g(0, 1) +
∑M
m=1 ω
3
tmvm ≥ 0
and equation (17), (18)
normalization-additvity constraints equation (19)
qt ∈ {0, 1}
This optimization, which can be solved via MINLP techniques, yields the estimated prob-
ability for each unknown, which include the probabilities for our structural parameter θ.
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Thus the estimated θˆ can be recovered from the original reparameterization:
θˆGME =
M∑
m=1
pˆθmzm (24)
Note that if the payoff function is linear in all covariates, x, then the optimization
problem becomes a convex MINLP, since the objective entropy function is always concave.
For the game which has additional players, actions, or stages, the estimation can be easily
extended to involve more constraints.
The GME estimator proposed above essentially is a MPEC style estimator, as argued
by Su and Judd (2008), implementing asymptotic inference methods is more complex
within the MPEC framework. Computing standard errors requires the computation of
the Hessian of the objective function with respect to the structural parameters θ. Such
work seems hard due to the non-smoothness of our GME estimation.
Horowitz (1997, 1998, 2001) explains how some non-smooth estimators can be
smoothed in a way that greatly simplifies the analysis of their asymptotic distributional
properties. Smoothing our GME estimator is also possible since for most cases we can
reformulate the MINLP problem into a nonlinear programming (NLP) with complemen-
tarity constraints (MPCC). Chen and Mangasarian (1996) provides a class of smoothing
functions for nonlinear and mixed complementarity problems.
Alternatively, some recently derived resampling methods can deal with such nonreg-
ular estimators. Zeng and Lin (2008) suggests some efficient resampling procedures for
non-smooth estimators based on asymptotic expansion via empirical process arguments.
Andrews and Guggenberger (2009) also provides some efficient Hybrid and Size-Corrected
subsampling methods. We will investigate these alternative methods for inference within
our GME estimation framework in future work.
As noted above, our framework can deal with a wide range of random shock structures
which depart from the i.i.d assumption. One example is market specific shocks also
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considered by Maruyama (2009). Consider the simple entry game in figure.2, where the
random preference shock for player i in market t is specified as:
ǫit(a) = ωit(a) + ηi (25)
The market specific shock ηi and idiosyncratic preference shock ωit(a) are both indepen-
dently distributed across players (entrants) and markets. We can individually estimate
ωit(a) and ηi instead of ǫit(a), using an additive entropy objective function.
5 Monte Carlo
To demonstrate the performance of our estimator in small samples, we conducted two
Monte Carlo experiments using the simple sequential entry game introduced in section 2.
There are two players and each player has the following profit function:
ui(x, a, ǫi; θ) = 1(ai = 1){θ1x1 + θ2xi2 − θ3xi3 + ǫi(a)} (26)
We define x1 ∼ N(10, 1), xi2 ∼ N(1, 1), and xi3 = 9(N(a)−1), where N(a) is the number
of entrants from an action profile a. In the first experiment, the idiosyncratic error terms,
ǫit(a), are drawn from the standard normal distribution. In the second experiment, ǫit(a)
are drawn from the uniform distribution [−1, 1].
As discussed previously, our model requires both scale and location normalizations, so
we assume that θ3 = 1 and the payoffs from not entering are zero. Thus our game has
two unknown parameters: θ1 and θ2. We generated 10000 samples of size t = 25, 50, 100,
and 200 to assess the finite sample properties of our estimator. The true parameter vector
values were chosen as θ1 = 1 and θ2 = −1. The parameter estimates are presented in
Tables I and II. The empirical distributions of parameter estimates are reported in Figures
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Table I: Monte Carlo Results for Normal Shocks
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
θ1 1.1651 1.1350 0.1387 0.1651 0.1350 0.0465
θ2 −2.5561 −2.3814 0.8934 −1.5561 −1.3814 3.2194
T = 50
θ1 1.0471 1.0388 0.0555 0.0471 0.0388 0.0052
θ2 −1.5566 −1.4607 0.4868 −0.5566 −0.4607 0.5466
T = 100
θ1 0.9934 0.9924 0.0247 −0.0066 −0.0076 0.0006
θ2 −1.0449 −1.0265 0.2215 −0.0449 −0.0265 0.0511
T = 200
θ1 0.9944 0.9941 0.0142 −0.0056 −0.0059 0.0002
θ2 −1.0403 −1.0344 0.1171 −0.0403 −0.0344 0.0153
True value: θ1 = 1, θ2 = −1; Monte Carlo Times: 10000
c and d.
The results are encouraging even in smaller samples sizes; the payoff parameters are
estimated close to their true values, and as the sample size increases, the estimates become
more precise. Parameter θ1 is estimated more precisely. This is mainly because θ1 has a
larger influence over equilibrium than θ2, since θ1 interacts with a covariate with a higher
mean than θ2 does. In an extremely small sample, the variation in θ2 may not generate
sufficient variation in equilibrium to be estimated precisely but this problem disappears
as the sample size becomes larger.
The second simulation shows that our GME estimator can handle non-normal errors.
The empirical distributions of the parameter estimates shown in figures 3 and 4 also show
that our GME estimator is asymptotically normally distributed.
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Table II: Monte Carlo Results for Uniform Shocks
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
θ1 1.1660 1.1378 0.1410 0.1660 0.1378 0.0474
θ2 −2.5643 −2.4009 0.8977 −1.5643 −1.4009 3.2528
T = 50
θ1 1.0461 1.0371 0.0548 0.0461 0.0371 0.0051
θ2 −1.5472 −1.4479 0.4841 −0.5472 −0.4479 0.5338
T = 100
θ1 0.9937 0.9931 0.0253 −0.0063 −0.0069 0.0007
θ2 −1.0460 −1.0283 0.2238 −0.0460 −0.0283 0.0521
T = 200
θ1 0.9946 0.9941 0.0141 0.005 4 0.0059 0.0002
θ2 −1.0435 −1.0383 0.1149 0.0435 0.0383 0.0151
True value: θ1 = 1, θ2 = −1; Monte Carlo Times: 10000
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Figure c: Distribution of Estimators with Normal Shocks
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a data-constrained GME estimator for the discrete sequential-
move game of perfect information. By directly using the data-constraints which are im-
plied by the equilibrium conditions, we avoid the multidimensional integration which
always makes such estimation intractable. Moreover, in contrast to existing estimators
for general complete information games, our GME estimator requires no parametric as-
sumption about the distribution of the random shocks. We formulate the estimation as
a (convex) mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem. The estimation can be easily
implemented on optimization software with high-level interfaces such as GAMS or AMPL.
The model is identified with only weak scale and location normalizations. Monte Carlo
evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately sized samples.
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